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FOUR BASIC NOTIONS OF THE COMMON
GOOD
BROTHER DANIEL P. SULMASY, O.F.M.t
INTRODUCTION
I am delighted to be here among lawyers-it is a rare
I am very grateful to John
opportunity for a physician.
Coughlin, my brother, for asking me to think about the common
good. I told him that I never think about the common good and
in trying to get me to be a better Franciscan he asked me to do
so. I think it flows well from what Professor Harper just spoke
to us about.
I am going to talk about different ways of thinking about
this term common good. The term is frequently tossed about
these days, both inside and outside Catholic circles. The term
"common good" has a lot of different kinds of meanings and they
are not always clearly distinguished. I would like to try to bring
a little more conceptual clarity by describing four basic notions of
the common good. Each is going to have two subtypes; this
makes it a little complex. Then I am going to say what part or
parts I believe the Catholic notion of the common good to be.
Finally, I am going to test my account of the common good by
analyzing the case of assisted suicide to see if what I have come
up with supports the traditional Aristotelian argument that one
reason that suicide is wrong is that it is a sin against the
common good.
I use the terms the aggregative common good, the common
common good, the supersessive common good, and the integral
common good to describe four different ways I think the word or
phrase "common good" is used.

t Ph.D., Georgetown University; M.D., A.B., Cornell University. Professor of
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THE AGGREGATIVE COMMON GOOD

The aggregative common good is the common good that is
the aggregate sum of all the goods of all the individuals in the
social unit.
There are two versions of this. There is a
sentimentalist version and a utilitarian version.
The
sentimentalist version describes the early moral sentiment
theorists such as Francis Hutcheson. He coined the phrase, "the
greatest good for the greatest number."'
It is aggregative
because it sums up the individual goods, but it has some rather
significant conceptual and moral problems.
It makes no
reference to the distribution of the bad. That is one of the
problems in saying "the greatest good for the greatest number."
Utilitarians had a different way of talking about the
aggregative common good in a radically egalitarian notion.
Bentham points out the good of each count for one and none for
more than one. 2 For Mills, the Greatest Happiness Principle
takes the happiness and unhappiness and sums it over the social
unit. 3 Again, there is aggregation because there is a balancing of
the good and the bad.
As Professor Harper also pointed out, the aggregative sense
of the common good is a popular way to think about it in our
western world today, especially among economists and policy
experts who are steeped in cost-effective analysis. As MacIntyre
pointed out, this has the "argumentative form of utilitarianism."4
A lot of people think about the aggregate effect of good and bad
ina unit.

II. THE COMMON COMMON GOOD
Next, we sometimes hear or read about the common good as
the common common good. Scholars sometimes use the phrase,
cccommon good," to refer to goods we hold in common. There are
two subtypes to the common common good: the possessive
1 See MORAL PHILOSOPHY FROM MONTAIGNE TO KANT: AN ANTHOLOGY, 505
(J.B. Schneewind ed., 1990) (The actual phrase is "the greatest happiness for the
greatest number").
2

See id. at 460-502.

a See JAMES

V. McGLYNN & JULES J. TONER, MODERN ETHICAL THEORIES 53-

60 (1962).

4 See Alasdair Maclntyre, "Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis:" An Essay
on the Release of Moral Philosophy to Bureaucratic Theory, in ETHICAL THEORY
AND BUSINESS 266-87 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 1983); see also
ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY

(1984).
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common common good and the teleological common common
good.
The possessive common common good is the way a scholar
refers to the possessions we hold in common. It is the things we
hold in common: air, water, and space. For instance, Finnis
would talk about this as a type of common good as the amount of
happiness or goodness in the world that we would hold in
common. 5 Garrett Hardin, in his famous essay, The Tragedy of
6
the Commons, talks about the common good in this way.
The teleological common common good is the way scholars
refer to the common good as those goods towards which each of
us aims. For Aquinas this teleological common common good is
to know the truth about God and to live in community. That is
the good we have in common. It is that towards which we all
aim. For Finnis and Grisez this consists of a list, the basic list of
common basic human goods. 7 These are the things each of us, as
humans, have in common, and toward which we aim.
The possessive common common good, however, finds a
place in almost everybody's moral theory. Its scope, whether it
be large or small, depends upon other elements in that theory.
But, the idea of the teleological common common good is
especially problematic for liberal theorists who begin by denying
that it is possible to have a common common good towards which
each of us absolutely aims. This is because the teleological
common common good weighs upon their morals.
III. THE SUPERSESSIVE COMMON GOOD
The third notion of the common good of which one
sometimes hears is the supersessive common good.
The
supersessive common good is common good that is believed to
override all of the individuals who constitute the community. It
takes on a life of its own. There are two subtypes of the
supersessive common good, a factional type and a Hegelian type.
The factional type includes those systems in which some
5 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
6 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, reprinted in MANAGING
THE COMMONS 16-30 (Garrett Hardin & John Baden eds. 1977).
7 See FINNIS, supra note 5, at 85-91. Finnis states these "basic forms of good for
us" include: "life," "play," "knowledge," "aesthetic experience," "friendship,"
"practical reasonableness," and "religion." Id.; see also GERMAIN GRISEZ & RUSSELL
SHAW, BEYOND THE NEW MORALITY: THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF FREEDOM 42-53

(1974).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:303

portion of the population takes on the role of representing the
common good, often through the State. This State may be in the
form of a monarchy, an oligarchy, or a junta. Its rule may be
benign or malignant. It may take the form of L'etat c'est moi.8
So the supersessive common good is self-pleasing. It states "I am
the king" or more familiarly, "what's good for business is good for
America." The individual good of a few people becomes the
common good of all.
In Hegelian thought there is the view that the State
supersedes the interests of the individuals. The interests of the
individuals are synthetically and systematically subsumed into
the State. Their spirit is made concrete in the State and is
susceptible to distortion and manipulation.
There is the
constant danger of collapsing to totalitarianism, which is not
popular in the western world.
IV. THE INTEGRAL COMMON GOOD

The fourth notion of the common good is the integral
common good. This is the kind of good that comes explicitly from
mutual human interaction and cannot be divided into equally
aggregative parts. There are two types of integral common good:
a conditional integral common good and a constitutive integral
common good.
The conditional integral common good is a good that comes
from mutual association.
Finnis describes it as "a set of
conditions which enables the members of the community to
attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize
reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which
they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or
negatively) in a community."9 In other words, there is a common
good that is a set of conditions which allows members of society
to come together, but only for the purpose of each individual to
flourish.
The constitutive common good refers to those more robust
notions of the common good that hold that being in a community
of relationships with other human beings is itself a good.
Therefore, being in a relationship, being part of the community,
being part of each other is itself a good. It is a good that either
SDIcTIONNAIRE JURODIQUE I, FRANsAIS-ANGLAis (1953).
9 FINNIS, supra note 5, at 155.
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partly or completely desires what is the good for me. This means
that part of my good is the good of the community of us in this
room. I think this is the most traditional sense of the common
good. This is what Aristotle meant when he said man or people
are political animals. St. Thomas said every man or every one of
us is part of the community, so that we belong to the community
in virtue of what we are. The relationship of being in the
community is the value of the constitutive common good.
V.

CLASSIFYING PHILOSOPHERS' NOTIONS OF COMMON GOOD

We observe similarities and differences when we classify
philosophers using this set of notions of the common good. For
instance, the utilitarians all employ the notion of the aggregative
common good. Many of them also employ the teleological
common common good. According to Mill everybody is already
prescribed to aim at happiness. Bentham thought everyone's
goal was pleasure. Today, however, most utilitarians deny that
there is really a common common good.
A liberal such as Rawls would scoff at the teleological
common common good. He would accept the conditional integral
common good. He believed we come together only on the
condition that it helps us with our own projects.1 0 There is no
good out there that we have in common. The common good is
simply that set of conditions that allows us to live by our own
lights and to finish our own projects.
A natural law thinker like Finnis has a strong notion of the
teleological common common good. This is evident in those basic
human goods we talked about; friendship, religion and life. He
also holds a more restrained notion of the conditional integral
common good, just like the liberal thinkers. For Finnis it is that
set of conditions that help each of us to realize the common good
that is ours.
A communitarian like Michael Sandel would have a
different view. He holds a stronger notion of the integral
common good: the constitutive integral common good. Sandel
states, "community describes not just what they have as human
beings but also what they are, not a relationship they choose, as

10 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-24 (rev. ed., Harvard Univ. Press
1999) (1971); see also JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 242-45 (Samuel Freeman

ed., 1999).
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in voluntary association, but an attachment they discover, not
merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity.""
Therefore, being in community in the constitutive integral
sense of the common good is part of the new communitarianism.
Communitarians, however, like liberals, are agnostics about a
teleological common common good. Thus, while they believe
being together is itself a good, they cannot say exactly what it is
we are suppose to do once we are together.
The Catholic tradition, which has Aristotelian-Thomistic
roots, affirms both the teleological common common good and the
constitutive integral common good. Thus, the good for each of us
is specified, and part of the good for each of us is being in
relation to the community. Yet there is a goal towards which
each of us moves, which runs afoul of both the new
communitarians and liberals in its deliberate and definitive
specification of the good for each.
Although that is a lot to sort out, it helps to be able to figure
out where people are at when they throw around the phrase, the
"common good," around in ways that are very different from the
way others use the phrase. And, mixing and matching different
interpretations of the "common good," one can show how things
work.
VI. THE COMMON GOOD AND SUICIDE
I now want to discuss the more challenging question posed
by Professor Harper: does the adoption of the new natural law
theorist view of the common good in place of the more classical
Catholic notion of the common good make any difference? Does
it make a difference whether you take this strong integral sense
of the common good in a constitutive way or whether you take it
in the more conditional way that Finnis does? To illustrate that,
I want to discuss suicide.
I do not know how many of you know Thomas of Aquinas'
arguments about why suicide is wrong. There are basically
12
three arguments: it is unnatural, ungrateful and anti-social. It
is unnatural because it is a sin against nature because being and
goodness are co-extensive in St. Thomas' metaphysical schema.

1 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, Justice and the Good, reprinted in LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150 (1988).
12 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (1273)
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Nature builds a survival instinct in everyone and a rational
creature cannot overcome that instinct without behaving
irrationally. Suicide is also an act of ingratitude towards God.
God gave us life as a gift.
St. Thomas' belief that suicide is anti-social is based on the
notion that it is a sin against the common good. If you kill
yourself, it's a sin against the common good. There is support for
13
this belief in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.
What does Finnis say about suicide? Interestingly, Finnis
does not say much about suicide. If you look in the index of
Natural Law and Natural Rights you are directed to "see
murder"14 and then there is one footnote about suicide.' 5
Can Finnis' view of the common good claim that suicide is a
sin against the common good? If he is a proponent of the
conditional integral common good, which believes in association
for one's individual purpose, I do not think he can, if he is to
remain consistent to this view.
If I am in excruciating pain and I am not flourishing in a
community, I can opt out of the association with the community.
The common good no longer serves its conditional purpose of
helping me to flourish; therefore, suicide is not an offense
against the common good. I do not think Finnis would say
suicide is wrong because it is anti-social. I do not believe Finnis
is a fan of suicide, as I am sure Professor Harper would know.
Finnis would say, well, the purpose of the association, the
common good of the society, is to help me to flourish as an
individual. If I do not recognize life as a basic good, then I am
not flourishing as a human being and the community cannot
support me in my decision not to commit suicide. This collapses
into an argument against suicide based on the teleological
common good. Suicide is wrong because it is not good for any
human being.
That is a variation on St. Thomas' first argument against
suicide because it is unnatural. I think Finnis would say suicide
is "unnatural" because it is unreasonable.
St. Thomas, Aristotle and Catholic social thinking can say
suicide is wrong because it is an act against the teleological
common good because they hold that being in a relationship is a
13 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Oswald trans., 1962).

14 See FINNIS, supra note 5, at 424.
15See id. at 229.
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good in itself. So if I kill myself, I have directly harmed the
common good, I have directly harmed my relationship with God.
They also hold that we all have the common common good.
A new communitarian like Sandel might also hold that
suicide is wrong on the grounds that it is anti-social, not that it
is unnatural. He is an agnostic about the teleological common
common good. He cannot say that being alive is a good for
everybody because it is up to us to individually choose what is
good for us.
He would say that he strongly believes in
relationships.
These will probably not answer Professor Harper's question.
These diverse thoughts come to the same conclusion using
different notions of the common good. He might ask whether it
matters. Since they employ different reasons, perhaps there will
be cases in which these theories diverge and I am simply not
clever enough to figure out what they are.
This leads to more questions. Is the common good actually
identical with my own good? Is it merely part of my own good?
Does it simply mean that I have to overcome my usual petty
jealousies and actually rejoice when a colleague writes an
interesting paper I wish I had written and consider her success
part of my own? Does a constitutive notion of the integral
common good not lean dangerously toward the supersessive
common good?
These and a lot of other interesting questions, I think, could
be fruitfully debated. But I hope at least this classification may
help bring some clarification to this very difficult notion of the
common good and help us answer some of the questions that I
posed. There is a lot at stake in how we answer them.

